SouthernWorldwide.com – On November 4, 1979, I was on duty at the headquarters of the 8th Infantry Division in Bad Kreuznach, West Germany. Late that day, a message arrived: radical Iranian revolutionaries had stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and taken dozens of Americans hostage. My task was to deliver this report to the division commander, Maj. Gen. William J. Livsey, and keep him updated as the situation evolved.
No specific orders were issued. No one fully grasped that we were witnessing the genesis of a geopolitical challenge that would outlast the Cold War, engage seven American presidencies, and remain unresolved half a century later.
That seizure revealed more than just a diplomatic humiliation. When the embassy fell, America lacked a military command specifically responsible for the Persian Gulf. CENTCOM did not yet exist. The hostage crisis, followed weeks later by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, necessitated this realization. President Carter established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in March 1980, which evolved into today’s CENTCOM in January 1983. The 1979 embassy seizure did not simply embarrass a superpower; it fundamentally reshaped how America organized its military posture in the Middle East.
FROM HOSTAGE CRISIS TO ASSASSINATION PLOTS: IRAN’S NEAR HALF-CENTURY WAR ON AMERICANS
Today, as Washington engages in negotiations for a tentative 60-day memorandum of understanding to extend the ceasefire, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and outline a framework for nuclear discussions, my thoughts return to that November evening in Bad Kreuznach. While the specific details have changed, the fundamental dynamic remains the same.
Current headlines in Washington focus on ceasefires, sanctions relief, Iran’s 440-kilogram stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%—a technical step away from weapons-grade—and competing memorandums of understanding. These details are significant, but they do not represent the core narrative.
The central story is one of strategic patience. For 47 years, every American administration has employed a combination of deterrence, diplomacy, sanctions, covert operations, and direct military force to influence Iran’s behavior. Seven presidents have pursued different strategies, yielding varied outcomes. The regime has outlasted all of them.
WHY THE MIDDLE EAST AGREES WITH PRESIDENT TRUMP MORE THAN AMERICA REALIZES
The clerical government has endured the Iran-Iraq War, severe economic sanctions, domestic unrest, cyberattacks on its nuclear facilities, targeted assassinations of senior commanders, Operation Midnight Hammer, and now Operation Epic Fury. Throughout these challenges, Tehran’s primary objective has remained unwavering.
Their goal is survival.
THE REAL IRAN THREAT IS IN BLACK AND WHITE: IT’S EVEN IN THEIR CONSTITUTION
This might seem like a modest objective, but it is not. Survival is not a secondary outcome of Iran’s strategy; it is the strategy itself. Grasping this distinction is crucial for an accurate analysis, moving beyond the wishful thinking that has clouded Washington’s Iran policy for five decades.
The reason Washington consistently misinterprets Tehran’s intentions stems not from a lack of intelligence, but from a failure of imagination. Americans instinctively perceive Iran as a conventional nation-state pursuing recognizable geopolitical interests. We assume that sufficient pressure or incentives will eventually persuade Tehran to conform to the norms of the international community. This assumption has proven incorrect for 47 years.
Iran’s clerical rulers do not view themselves as administrators of a nation-state. They see themselves as custodians of a revolutionary project initiated in 1979, divinely appointed to resist what they perceive as perpetual Western hostility. While sanctions relief and diplomatic legitimacy are desirable, neither objective supersedes the imperative to protect the regime.
THINK WE’RE LOSING THE WAR IN IRAN? CONSIDER WHERE THINGS REALLY STAND
In my book “Preparing for World War III,” I posited that America’s principal adversaries operate on decadal timelines rather than election cycles. They absorb setbacks and strategically position themselves for the long term. This observation applies to China and Russia, and with equal force to Iran. In “Kings of the East,” I cautioned that authoritarian regimes possess a strategic patience that democracies find difficult to match, as their leaders are not bound by election schedules or media scrutiny. Tehran has demonstrated both these principles for half a century.
This disparity illuminates the recurring pattern in negotiations. Each new proposal generates cautious optimism, only for new conditions to emerge, timelines to shift, and demands to multiply. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization has already stated that Iran will not accept limitations on its nuclear enrichment. Last year, Foreign Minister Araghchi declared enrichment a non-negotiable right, a sentiment echoed by Iranian lawmakers who termed it a “red line” and an “inalienable right.” While the memorandum of understanding under discussion addresses the fate of existing enriched material, the right to re-enrich remains a fundamental Iranian position.
Consider the historical pattern. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action capped enrichment at 3.67% and limited stockpiles to 300 kilograms. Iran agreed to these terms, leveraging the sanctions relief to expand its regional network. President Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Tehran subsequently dismantled every constraint systematically, increasing enrichment levels to 20%, then beyond 60%, until military action disrupted the program once more.
ANY NEW IRAN DEAL SHOULD BE JUDGED BY RESULTS, NOT VICTORY-LAP RHETORIC
The underlying lesson is not structural but theological. Ayatollah Khomeini did not establish the Islamic Republic as a government destined for conventional statehood. He founded it as a revolution imbued with a divine mandate, a mandate inherited by his successors. No memorandum of understanding can alter a creed. If the talks culminate in a deal, Iran will meticulously scrutinize every clause for leverage. If they fail, Tehran will absorb the repercussions, regroup where possible, and present itself to the Muslim world as the power that once again defied America.
In either scenario, the regime’s revolutionary identity will remain intact—a truth no press release can obscure.
Diplomacy is preferable to another major military engagement in the Middle East. No serious strategist would welcome an outcome that further destabilizes global energy markets, endangers American forces, or eliminates the possibility of a lasting settlement. President Trump deserves commendation for pursuing negotiations and for maintaining military pressure when Tehran faltered.
However, successful diplomacy demands honest analysis, not wishful thinking. The peril lies not in America negotiating with Iran, but in America negotiating under the assumption that Tehran’s fundamental calculus has shifted.
Nothing in the Islamic Republic’s history—spanning nine American administrations, two Israeli wars, and the most extensive sanctions campaign in modern history—supports this assumption. The regime that seized our embassy in 1979 built its entire identity around enduring American pressure. It has consistently done so ever since.
Forty-seven years after I delivered that initial report to General Livsey, Washington continues to grapple with the same adversary. The names have changed. The weaponry has evolved. The uranium enrichment percentages have changed.
The regime’s core objective has not.
Tehran is once again playing the long game, and the memorandum of understanding on the table may merely serve to buy time for the next phase. The critical question is whether Washington will finally negotiate as realists—or whether we will approach the table, as we so often have before, as the more eager party.
