Russian Generals’ Killings Highlight Deepening Divide Within Putin’s Security Services

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SouthernWorldwide.com – The recent assassinations of high-ranking Russian generals have brought to light a growing internal discord within Vladimir Putin’s security apparatus, suggesting a widening rift between the military and the country’s powerful domestic security service.

For the second time in just over a year, an explosion rocked the Moscow suburb of Balashikha, resulting in the death of a prominent Russian military official. On June 9, a bomb planted beneath a BMW detonated as the driver was leaving a parking lot. Independent Russian outlet The Insider identified the victim as Lt. Gen. Damir Davydov, a Defense Ministry official tasked with supplying crucial missile and artillery ammunition to forces engaged in Ukraine.

The location of this incident is particularly noteworthy. The explosion occurred approximately 1,150 feet from the site where Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik, deputy chief of the Main Operations Directorate of Russia’s General Staff, was killed in a car bombing in April 2025. This detail was reported by the French newspaper Le Monde.

Months prior to Moskalik’s death, another senior Russian officer met a similar fate in Moscow. Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, who headed Russia’s nuclear, biological, and chemical protection troops, was killed by a bomb hidden in an electric scooter that exploded outside his apartment building. A source within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) informed Reuters that the agency was responsible for this operation.

These targeted killings are part of a larger pattern of assassinations and attempted assassinations against senior Russian military figures. A European intelligence source suggests this campaign is now exposing underlying tensions within Putin’s own security system.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022, a significant number of senior Russian military personnel have been killed. Their deaths have occurred through various means, including missile strikes, drone attacks, car bombings, crashes, and combat on the front lines. According to a European intelligence source, this mounting toll is contributing to internal friction between the Russian military and the FSB, Russia’s formidable domestic security service and the successor to the Soviet KGB.

This dispute is indicative of a deeper rivalry within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. For a long time, security services have enjoyed a privileged position over the armed forces, as indicated by multiple sources. This historical dynamic predates the current conflict.

“This goes back to Soviet times,” the European intelligence source stated. “The security services do not like the military, and the military does not like the security services.”

The core of this tension, as explained by the European intelligence source and Russian opposition figure Maxim Katz, lies within Putin’s own system. The ongoing war has amplified the importance of the military on the battlefield. However, the political establishment in Moscow continues to view its generals as a potential threat to their authority.

This creates a paradox for the Kremlin. Russia relies heavily on its military commanders to sustain the war effort. Yet, the security services, which hold considerable sway within Putin’s regime, appear hesitant to assume responsibility for safeguarding these very generals.

Independent Russian outlet Mediazona has confirmed the deaths of at least 15 Russian generals since the full-scale invasion began. This figure includes five lieutenant generals, seven major generals, and three retired generals.

Some of these losses occurred far from Moscow, closer to the active combat zones. Lt. Gen. Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of Russia’s Southern Military District, was killed in July 2023 by a Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike on the Russian-occupied city of Berdiansk.

Maj. Gen. Sergei Goryachev, chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army, perished in June 2023 during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia region. Additionally, Maj. Gen. Vladimir Zavadsky, deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps, was killed near Krynky in southern Ukraine in November 2023.

Other high-ranking officers were targeted within Russia or in Russian-controlled territories. Lt. Gen. Alexander Otroshchenko, a senior Russian air force commander, died in March 2026 following a military transport plane crash over occupied Crimea.

Retired Maj. Gen. Kanamat Botashev, who was flying for the Wagner Group, was killed in May 2022 after his Su-25 aircraft was shot down over Ukraine’s Luhansk region.

The casualties began in the initial weeks of the Ukraine invasion. Maj. Gen. Andrei Sukhovetsky, deputy commander of Russia’s 41st Combined Arms Army, and Maj. Gen. Vladimir Frolov, deputy commander of the 8th Army, were among the first to die.

Maxim Katz explained that the military has historically occupied a vulnerable position within the Russian power structure. The Kremlin has long harbored fears of popular military figures, as the army represents one of the few institutions with the potential to challenge political authority.

“You will not find Russian military men in senior government positions,” Katz remarked. “Since Stalin, they have been afraid of the army. Whenever there is a relatively well-known military figure with a name of his own, they deal with it somehow — legally, or like with Prigozhin, or like with other generals. In Russia, there is no such thing as a popular general.”

Katz further argued that even during wartime, when the military might be expected to gain prestige, Putin’s system actively works to keep the army politically weak. “The army does not take part in decision-making,” he stated. “It is funded now, but everything goes to the war. The generals are rich, but not like ministers or FSB people. Among the elites, they are the most deprived.”

This dynamic, according to Katz, helps explain why Russian generals might be reluctant to entrust the FSB with their protection. “For them, the FSB is a much bigger threat than the Ukrainian army,” Katz asserted. “The Ukrainian army kills a general once in a while. The FSB puts generals in prison much faster.”

The European intelligence source emphasized that these killings are significant not only due to the operational losses but also because of their psychological impact on the Russian army. “Putin understands that losing prominent Russian generals can affect morale within the Russian army, which is already low from the Russian perspective,” the source commented.

The apparent solution to this dilemma, according to the European intelligence source, was to shift the responsibility for military protection away from the FSB. “The FSB did not want to deal with military protection, so the security service of the Russian presidential administration would take care of those generals,” the source explained.

Katz suggested that the internal pressures on Putin may also intersect with Russia’s parliamentary elections scheduled for September, a factor he believes Western observers are largely overlooking. He anticipates that the elections will not be free and that the Kremlin will manipulate the results.

However, Katz argued that if public support for Putin’s United Russia party has significantly declined, it could make it more challenging for the regime to present believable official results. “Everyone already knows what results they will announce,” Katz said. “The question is whether anyone will believe those results.”

Katz elaborated that Putin’s system has long relied on not just control but also on the perception of broad public support. “Putin has never ruled in a situation where he does not have a majority,” Katz stated. “His legitimacy rests on everyone believing that he has majority support. Once everyone believes he does not have a majority, and that he did not just cheat a little but simply drew the results, that is a different story.”

He drew a parallel to authoritarian systems that are compelled to transition from managed popularity to overt coercion. “Putin cannot lose like Orban,” Katz concluded. “But if everyone in Russia knows that everyone voted against him and he drew the results in his favor, that would be a new situation. He has never been in that position before.”

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